Armenia and Karabagh would be linked by territory passing through the town of Lachin, Azeri refugees would have the right of return to Shushi, the territory outside of Karabagh under Armenian control would be released and Azerbaijan would have an internationally guaranteed customs-free transit route into Nakhichevan through Meghri.

Of course, we know what happened then. Aliyev the elder returned to Baku, had cold feet and the Azeris deny that any of this was discussed, especially now the presidency has been passed to Aliyev jnr. Of course, the seemingly tougher line taken by Ilham might all be for show with parliamentary elections looming on the horizon.

I suppose it’s possible that in the current round of negotiations that the talk of a referendum to determine Karabagh’s status is designed to delay a domestic backlash in Azerbaijan until trade and confidence building measures are in place. The international mediators are apparently visiting Armenia again in June and then will visit all three republics in July.

Probably, everything will be a lot clearer by then.

Onnik, while we possibly do not disagree on this issue, I feel uneasy when I read in your post how “many nationalists in the Diaspora seem concerned only with the territories surrounding Karabagh”. Could you be more specific please? That would contribute to a more balanced discussion of the different point of views.

Apart from the polemics of that wording, it also reminds me of the term “nationalist Armenian diaspora” always referred to by Turkish officials and their supporters.

Only then can we talk about the territories and I think this is what Serzh Sarkisyan and Samuel Babayan were alluding to when they said recently that it was imperative that Karabagh be recognized internationally and that returning the territories will be key to Armenia achieving this. However, they also specified that how many territories are returned depends on Armenia’s position in negotiations.

In this respect, I think they are referring to the status of Lachin and Kelbajar which is why I think these two regions will be left to the end and will probably be amost as difficult to reach agreement on as the status of Karabagh itself.

Basically, however, whenever we blog about resolution of the Karabagh conflict there are a handful of people out there who say nothing should be returned but who are also not prepared to put their lives on the line if the war breaks out again as a result. I certainly wasn’t implying that the Diaspora is full of nationalists unwilling to compromise.

In fact, I think the Diaspora is mainly made up of a silent majority.

Any thoughts in light of this?

BTW: I tried to find a site with more about Aivazian’s research, but I guess the best I could come across was this, which talks about/promotes the published findings of his research.

So the return of refugees to Shushi and other regions–should Azeris for example decide to return to a totally ruined and inhabitable Aghdam–would be a good short-term solution would and demonstrate the willingness to compromise. But the children and subsequent generations of those former refugees would start to resent what happened in the past and conflict would ensue again, meaning a restart of a possible war in 20 years time or maybe sooner.

Also, as Onnik and I have discussed privately, in my opinion there should be no negotiating over the regions of Kelbajar and Lachin. Control over these regions strengthens Armenia’s geo-strategic positioning in the South Caucasus. I cannot say for sure as I do not have a map of the First Republic with me but I believe those territories were part of then Armenia anyway. Also, there should be no questioning of Karabagh’s integrity as an independent republic–if they decide to hold a referendum later on as to whether it become a part of Armenia as well as Kelbajar and Lachin then that would be ideal.

See http://www.hayastan.com/armenia/history/armenia/files/sevres_agreement1.jpg